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Introduction 
In principle, free trade can make everyone better off; but received theory, 
from Stolper and Samuelson (1941) to Jones (1971), suggests that this is unlikely 
to happen in practice. The changes in relative goods prices that come with ex­
panded trade produce changes in the distribution of income; and in the simple 
models which make up the core of trade theory these changes in income distribution 
invariably leave the owners of some factors of production absolutely worse off. 
The implication is that trade liberalization always involves trading off gains 
for some against losses for others, suggesting that moves toward freer trade will 
occur only rarely and after severe political struggles. 
If one looks at the historical record, however, especially in the post­
war period, it begins to appear as if this is one of those unusual cases in 
which theory has been too pessimistic about the consequences of laissez-faire. 
The last thirty years have been marked by a great increase in trade, especially 
among the industrial countries, with very few problems of adjustment. Only in 
recent years, with the growth of imports from the newly industrializing coun­
tries, have the pressures for protection again become strong. This experience 
of painless growth in trade is in itself a major riddle, but it is wrapped in 
the larger enigma of the pattern of trade. Standard theory predicts trade 
between countries with different factor endo'Wlllents, with countries specializing 
in goods with different factor intensities. Yet the growth in trade has largely 
been among the industrial countries, which appear to be fairly similar in factor 
endowment and surely have become more similar over time. And the trade among 
these countries is largely, and increasingly, two-way trade in similar products. 
Thus there are three great paradoxes of international trade: who trades with 
whom, what they trade in, and why it hurts so little. 
i. 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide a tentative explanation of these 
paradoxes, one which gives some guide to identifying situations in which expan­
sion of trade will and will not pose serious problems of income distribution. 
The explanation is not a new one: it is essentially the same as that put for­
ward by Balassa (1967), Grubel (1970), and Kravis (1971), among others. What 
this paper does is put the argument in terms of a formal model, a step which 
may be of some help in clarifying and disseminating ideas which have been "in 
the air" for some time. 
Briefly, the argument runs as follows. There are two kinds of trade: 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade, which is based on differences in factor proportions, 
and "intraindustry" trade, which is based on the interaction of economies of 
scale with product differentiation. Countries with similar factor endo'WI!lents 
will have little incentive for engaging in Heckscher-Olin trade, but will stil! 
engage in intraindustry trade, But intraindustry trade does not have the strong 
distributional effects of Heckscher-Ohlin trade. The result is that expansion 
of trade between countries with sufficiently similar factor endowments will not 
pose the distributional problems which Heckscher-Ohlin theory leads us to expect, 
Obviously, the crucial step in formalizing this argument is to model in­
traindustry trade, In this paper I use a simple model of intraindustry trade 
which was developed in an earlier paper (Krugman 1979), and extend it to a two­
industry, two-factor world, The structure of this model and the determination of 
this model's equilibrium in a closed economy is set forth in Section 1. Section 
2 shows how the pattern of trade between two countries is determined in the model, 
developing the basic relationship between differences in factor endowments and 
the extent of intraindustry trade, Section 3 then examines the effects of trade 
on income distribution, and shows how the extent of intraindustry trade deter­
mines whether scarce factors of production gain or lose from trade. Finally, 
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Section 4 summarizes the results and discusses some implications for theory 
and policy. 
It must be emphasized that the model presented here is in no sense a 
general one. In addition to making strong assumptions about functional forms 
of cost and utility functions, I impose a great deal of symmetry on the model 
to simplify the analysis and give a natural meaning to the concept of "similar­
ity" in factor proportions. Thus the results of the analysis are at best 
suggestive. Nonetheless, they seem intuitively plausible, and also seem to 
have something to do with actual experience. 
1. The Model in a Closed Economy 
Intraindustry trade depends on the existence of unexhausted economies 
of scale in production. The main problem in modelling this kind of trade is 
how to handle these scale economies, which must lead to a breakdown of perfect 
competition (unless they are wholly external to firms). In this paper, as in 
an earlier paper (Krugman 1979), I will use the device of Chamberlinian mono­
polistic competition, basing the model on recent work by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
An "inf]ustry" will consist of a large number of firms, all producing somewhat 
differentiated products, all operating on the dowuward-sloping parts 
average cost curves. There will be two-way international trade within an in­
dustry, because finps in different countries will produce different differen­
tiated products. What prevents countries from producing a complete range of 
products domestically is the existence of fixed costs in production; thus scale 
economies are the basic cause of intraindustry trade. 
Let us begin, however, with a two-industry model of a closed economy. 
All of the products in each industry will enter symmetrically into demand, with 
the two industries--industry 1 and industry 2--themselves playing symmetric 
roles. All individuals will have the convenient utility function 
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n2 e 11e 
u = + .tn( I C ) (1) 
j=l 2,j 
0<9<1 
where cl,i is consumption of the i
th 
produ~t of industry 1; c 2 ,j is con­
sumption of the j 
th product of industry 2; and n1
, n are the number of2 
products actually produced in each industry. The utility function (1) has 
several useful properties. First, it ensures that half of income will always 
be spent on industry l's products, half on industry 2's products. Second, if 
the number of products in each industry is large, it implies that every pro­
ducer faces a demand curve with elasticity 111-e. Finally, (1) will allow 
us to represent the gains and losses from trade in a particularly simple way. 
On the demand side, then, an industry is assumed to consist of a number 
of products which are imperfect substitutes for one another. On the supply 
side, however, they will be assumed to be perfect substitutes. There will be 
only two factors of production, type 1 labor and type 2 labor, each of which 
is wholly specific to an industry but nonspecific among products within an 
industry. Thus type 1 labor will be used only in industry 1, type 2 only in 
industry 2. Within each industry the labor required to produce a particular 
product will consist of a fixed set-up cost and a constant variable cost: 
(2) 
xwhere .tl,i is labor used in producing the i 
th 
product of industry 1; i1 
'' 
is the output of that product; and so on. To go from these required labor 
inputs to nominal costs we must multiply by the wage rates of the two types 
l 
of labor, and 
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To close the model, we begin by noting that output of each product, x, 
is the sum of individual consumptions of the product. At the same time, total 
employment in each industry is the sum of employment in producing all the in-




il,i s 11 c 2-z 
(3) 
O<z<l 
Thus the total labor force is set equal to 2, with the parameter z measuring 
factor proportions. As we will see below, z will assume crucial significance 
in determining the importance of intraindustry trade and the effect of trade on 
income distribution. 
We are now prepared to examine the determination of equilibrium in this 
model. This involves determining how many products are actually produced in 
each industry, the output of each product, the prices of products, and the 
relative wages of the two kinds of labor. We should note at the outset that 
it is indeterminate wh~ch products are produced--but it is also unimportant. 
Our first step is to determine the pricing policy of firms. We assume 
that producers can always costlessly differentiate their products. This means 
that each product will be produced by only one firm. If there are many products 
the elasticity of demand for each product will, as already noted, be 1/1-0. 
(This is proved in the Appendix). Thus each firm will face a demand curve of 
constant elasticity, We then have the familiar result that the profit-maximizing 
price will be marginal cost plus a constant percentage makeup: 
(4) 
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where are the prices of any products in industry 1 and 2 respectively 
which are actually produced. 
Given the pricing policy of firms, actual profits depend on sales: 
(5) 
where are sales of representative firms in the two industries. 
But in this model there will be free entry of firms, driving each in-
dustry to Chamberlin's "tangency solution" where profits are zero. Thus we 
can use the condition of zero profits in equilibrium to determine the equilib­




for the size of firms. The number of firms can then be determined from the 
full-employment condition: 
(7) 
The final step in determining equilibrium is to determine relative wages. 
This can be done very simply by noting that the industries receive equal shares 
of expenditure, and that since profits are zero in equilibrium thes.e receipts 




We now have a completely worked-out equilibrium for a two-sector, mono­
polistically competitive economy. It is indeterminate which of the range of 
potential products within each industry are actually produced, but since all 
products appear symmetrically, this is of no welfare significance. The character 
of the economy is determined by the two parameters z and 8. The value of z 
determines relative wages: if z is low, type 2 labor will receive much higher 
wages than type 1 labor. The value of 8 measures the degree of substituta­
bility among products within an industry. It is also, in equilibrium, a measure 
of the importance of scale economies. From (4) we have 8 c 8w1/p • 8w2/p2•1 
But 8w1
, ew2 are the marginal c
osts of production, while in equilibrium price 
equals average cost. Thus 8 is the ratio of marginal to average cost (which 
is also the elasticity of cost with respect to output). 
2. Factor Proportions and the Pattern of Trade 
In the last section we saw how equilibrium can be determined in a simple 
closed-economy model with scale economies and differentiated products. We can 
now examine what happens when two such economies trade. What we are principally 
concerned with is the proposition, advanced in the introduction, that countries 
with similar factor endowments will engage in "intraindustry;; trade, while 
countries with very different endowments will engage in Heckscher-Ohlin trade. 
As a first step we need a working measure of the extent of intraindustry 
trade. The empirical literature on intraindustry trade (e.g., Hufbauer and 
Chilas 1974, Grubel and Lloyd 1975) generally concentrates on an index of trade 
overlap, i.e., 
tlx -MI 
I • l _ _k__k___k_ (9) 
I (X. + M1)
k -k K 
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where ~ is ,a country's exports in industry k, ~ is imports in that in­
dustry. This index has the property that if trade is balanced industry by 
industry, it equals one, while if there is complete international specializa­
tion, so that every industry is either an export or import industry, it equals 
zero. As we will see, this index fits in quite well with the model of this 
paper. 
The other concept we need to tie down is that of "similarity" in factor 
endowments. In general this is not well defined. What I will do in this paper, 
however, is to consider a special case in which the concept does have a natural 
meaning, without trying to arrive at a general definition. 
Let us suppose, then, that there are two countries, the home country 
and the foreign country. The home country will be just as described in Section 
1. The foreign country will be identical, except for one thing: the relative 
sizes of the two industries' labor forces will be reversed. That is, the 
foreign country will be a mirror image of the home country. If we use a star 
on a variable to indicate that it refers to the foreign country, we have 
Ll 12 a::= 2-z z (10) 
* * 
Ll ,c: z Lz = 2-z 
Obviously, given this pattern of endowments we can regard z as an 
index of similarity in factor proportions. If z E 1, the countries have iden­
tical endowments, As z gets smaller, the factor proportions become increas-
ingly different. 
Now suppose these countries are able to trade, at zero transportation 
cost. As before, we can determine pricing behavior, the size and number of 
firms, and relative wages. In addition, we can determine the volume of pattern 
of trade. 
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The first point to note is that the elasticity of demand for any par­
ticular product is still 1/1-e. This gives us price equations exactly the 
same as before: 
-1 






D* e * 
P2 
-1 Sw2 
* • e * 
Now, however, the symmetry of the setup insures that all wages will be 
equal, both across industries and internationally: 
(12) 
The zero-profit condition will determine the equilibrium size of firm, 
x, which will be the same for both industries in both countries: 
(13)x = ae/S(l-e) 
Finally, full-employment determines the number of firms in each industry 
in each country: 
(14) 
What these results show is that trade will lead to factor price equali­
zation, while leaving the pattern of production unchanged. Our remaining task 
is to determine the volume and pattern of trade. We do this by noting twocan 
points. First, everyone will devote equal shares of expenditure to the two 
industries. Second, everyone will spend an equal amount on each of the products 
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within an industry. This means that the share of all individuals' income 
falling on, say, industry 1 products produced in the foreign country is 
* 1 nl 
2 •--*---that is, the industry share in expenditure times that country's 
nl+nl 
share of the industry. But the number of products is proportional to the 
labor force. Thus if we let Y be the home country's income, (equal to the 
foreign country's), x be exports of industry 1 products, be exports of1 x2 
industry 2 products, M be imports of industry 1 products, and be imports1 M2 
of industry 2 products, we have 
1= - y • (2-z/2) (15)Xl 2 
1
""-Y • (z/2)x2 2 




y • (2-z/2) 
Now the relations (15) have two important implications. First, consider 
the volume of trade, Total home country exports are Thus 
the ratio of trade to income is independent of z, the index of similarity in 
factor proportions. This can be regarded as an answer to the first empirical 
paradox mentioned in the introduction, the large volume of trade among similar 
countries. In this model similar countries will trade just as much as dissimilar 
countries. 
The second empirical paradox was the prevalence, in trade among similar 
countries, of two-way trade in similar products. If we substitute (15) into 
our expression for intraindustry trade (9), we get a simple, striking result: 
I • z (16) 
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Th!_ index 2f. intraindustry trade equals the index of similarity in factor 
progortions. 
This still leaves us with the third empirical paradox, which was that 
expansion of trade, when it involves largely intraindustry trade, seems to in­
volve few problems of income distribution. To see how this can be understood 
is the task of the next section. 
3. Gains and Losses from Trade 
In this section we must again begin by tying down a concept which I 
have been using loosely. This is the idea of the "seriousness" of distribution 
problems. 'What we need is a clear way of formulating the notion that distri­
bution problems from opening trade will not be serious if countries are suf­
ficiently similar in factor proportions, so that the trade which results is 
primarily intraindustry trade. 
The criterion I will U!lle to define nonserious distribution problems is 
the following: distribution problems arising from trade will be held not to 
be serious if both factors gain from trade. This of course begs some questions, 
since there may be difficulties in getting groups to accept a relative decline 
in income even if they are absolutely better off, But this criterion is fairly 
reasonable, and turns out to give suggestive results. 
To find out whether factors gain from trade, we need to know how utility 
depends on the variables of the model. Suppose an individual receives a wage 
w, and has the utility function (1). He will then spend w/2 on the products 
of each industry, and divide lis expenditure equally among the products within 
an industry. Thus his utility will depend on his wage, the prices of represen­
tative products in each industry, and the number of products available: 
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(17) 
• - 2tn 2 + tn w/p1 + in w/p 2 
+ ~ nn n + 1-e .tn0 ~ 1 e n2 
The function (17) has the convenient property that all the effects enter 
additively. Utility depends on real wages in terms of representative products 
and on diversity. 
To analyze the effects of trade on welfare, it is useful to introduce 
some more notation. 
• utility of workers in industry 1, 2 
• real wage of industry 1 workers in terms of products of 
industries 1 and 2 
s real wage of industry 2 workers in terms of products of 
industries 1 and 2 
Then we can substitute into (17) to get (suppressing the constant term) 
1-e 
Ul • .2.n wll + in w12 + 0 tn nl 
(18) 
+ 1-8 in n28 
We are now in a position to measure the welfare effects of trade. Sup­
pose we start from a position of autarky, as in Section 1, then move to free 
trade, as in Section 2. There will then be two kinds of effects. First, there 
will be a "Stolper-Samuelson" effect as factor prices are equalized. As one 
can easily verify, labor's real wage remains the same in terms of the products 
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of its own industry, while rising or falling in terms of the other industry's 
products depending on whether the factor is abundant or scarce. Thus in the 
home country this effect benefits labor in industry 1, hurts labor in industry 
2. 
The second effect comes from the increase in the size of the market, 
which makes a greater variety of products available. This works to everyone's 
benefit. 
Since both effects work in its favor, the abundant factor must be made 
better off. This leaves us with the problem of determining the change in 
utility of the scarce factor--industry 2 labor in the home country, and the 
symmetrically placed industry 1 labor in the foreign country. 
Let a prime on a variable indicate its free trade value, while unmarked 
variables refer to autarky. Then as we move from the autarky solution in 
Section 1 to the free trade solution in Section 2 the change in isu2 
' ' u2 - u2 sin Wz1lw21 + (19) 
, 0+ ..1.-0• .tn z/2-z tn 2/2-ze 
1-e+ - - tn 2/z
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where the first term is negative, and represents the Stolper-Samuelson distri­
bution loss; and the remaining terms are positive, and represent the gains 
from being part of a larger market. The question is under what conditions 
these terms will outweigh the first term. 
By collecting terms, we can rewrite (19) as 
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' 29-1 1 2 29 - .. - - in z - 6 in 2-z +Tin 2 
(20)u2 u 2 9 
This gives us one immediate result: if 9< 0.5, the scarce factor 
necessarily gains from trade, since the first term will be positive and the 
third term will outweigh the second. Recall that 9 is, in equilibrium, the 
ratio of marginal to average cost, and can thus be regarded as an index of the 
is that if scaleimportance of economies of scale. What this result then says 
economies~ sufficiently important, both factors gain from trade. 
If 9> 0.5, whether both factors gain depends on the extent to which 
trade is intraindustry in character, which in turn depends on how similar the 
countries are in factor proportions. When 9> 0.5, the function (20) has three 
properties: (i) as z approaches 1, u2 - u goes to 
2-29 tn 2 >O;
2 9 
(ii) as z goes to zero, u2 - u2 goes to minus infinity; 
(iii) u2 u2 is strictly increasing in zl.-
Thus if we were to-graph (20), it would look like Fig1.1:re 1. There is a critical 
u - = O. If z > z both factors gain; ifvalue of z, z, for which 2 u2 
z < z the scarce factor loses. But z is our measure of similarity in factor 
have shown is that if countries have sufficientlyproportions. Thus what we 
similar factor endowwents, both 
What is particularly'nice about this result is that we have already seen 
that there is a one-for-one relationship between similarity of factor endowments 
and intraindustry trade. So this result can be taken as a vindication of the 
arguments of such authors as Kravis (1971) and Hufbauer and Chilas (1974) that 
intraindustry trade poses fewer adjustment problems than Heckscher-Ohlin trade. 
We should note, however, that the critical value of intraindustry trade 
depends on the importance of scale economies. The function (20) is decreasing 
in 9: a(u2 
I 
- u )/a9 • 9
-2 
1n z(2-z) <O. So an increase in 9 will shift the 
2 

















important ~ scale economies, the ~ similar countries must be if both 
factors ~ to gain from trade. 




0. 7 •69 2 
0. 8 •825 
0.9 .923 
-In the limit, as 6 goes to 1, so does z. What this says is that a 
world in which scale economies are unimportant is a Heckscher-Ohlin world to 
awhich the Stolper-Samuelson theorem applies. But in this model this is only 
limiting case. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper began with three "paradoxes" about international trade. 
Since they do not seem so paradoxical in the light of this model, perhaps we 
should state them as "stylized facts": 
(i) Much of world trade is between countries with similar factor endowments; 
(ii) The trade between similar countries is largely "intraindustry" in charac­
ter, i.e., it consists of two-way trade in similar products; 
(iii) The growth of intraindustry trade has not posed serious income distribu­
tion problems. 
The model developed in this paper, which combines factor proportions 
theory with what is sometimes called "scale economies with differentiated prod­
ucts" theory, provides a simple-perhaps too simple--explanation of these styl­
ized facts. In this model, countries with similar factor proportions will 
trade just as much as countries with dissimilar factor proportions. Intrain­
dustry trade and similarity of factor proportions are directly related. And 
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trade between sufficiently similar countries will benefit scarce as well as 
abundant factors. 
In addition to helping make sense of some puzzling empirical results, 
this paper is, I hope, of some interest from the standpoint of pure theory. 
The model dispenses with the two most fundamental assumptions of standard 
trade theory: perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Instead, 
I have dealt in this paper with a world in which economies of scale are perva­
sive and all firms have monopoly power. While the model depends on extremely 
restrictive assumptions, it does show that it is possible for trade theory to 
make at least some progress into this virtually unexplored territory. 
Finally, the model appears to have some policy relevance. For it pro­
vides some theoretical justification for the commonly made argument that trade 
in manufactured goods poses less of a problem if it takes place between devel­
oped countries than if it takes place between developed and less-developed 
countries. What this suggests is that it may have been economic forces as 
much as political wisdom which made possible the great postwar liberalization 
of trade among the industrial countries. These same economic forces are now, 
unfortunately, working to block the growth of exports from today's newly in­
dustrializing countries. 
Appendix: Elasticity of Demand for Individual Products 
The analysis in Section 1 depends on the result that the elasticity of 
demand for any particular product is 1/1-0. This appendix gives a demonstra­
tion of this. 
Consider an individual maximizing his utility function (1) subject to 
a budget constraint. The first-order conditions from that maximization will 
have the form 
-(1-0)
cl i 
pl i -= , 0




). I: c2 ,mm 
where ). is the shadow price on the budget constraint, i.e., the marginal 
utility of income, 
If there are many products, however, the firm producing a particular 
product can take the denominators of these expressions as given. Thus each 
indivirlu~l'~ rlem~nd fnT ~ parti~ular product, and therefore also market demand, 
will have elasticity 1/1-0. 
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